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NSC BRIEFING  
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6 May 1954

### CURRENT SITUATION FRENCH MOROCCO

#### I. Worsening Indo-China situation affects

##### North Africa:

##### A. Most serious in French Morocco.

Nationalists will exert greater efforts  
obtain independence; French more  
determined than ever maintain hold.

#### II. Anti-US sentiment increasing:

##### A. Growing tendency nationalists to link US to French colonial policy, but

##### B. Terrorist attacks though shifted to French, not yet directed US airbases or Americans.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HB 70

DATE: 1-7-80

REVIEWER:

#### III. Anti-French Terrorism:

##### A. No let-up eight months despite vigorous French counter action.

1. Assassination, bombings, arson,  
railroad and communications sabotage.
2. Average one attack daily.

##### B. Recent shift attacks:

1. From pro-French Moroccans to French  
nationals.

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2. From urban to rural areas.

C. French relying strong police action.

D. Reinforced by new passive resistance movement:

1. Began April as show of nationalist strength, but has economic overtones.
2. Aimed French monopolies; bans on tobacco, bread; expected extend milk and sugar. Women required wear garb lesser yardage.
3. Ban Moroccans use of modern machinery on penalty crops burned.
4. Response immediate in Casablanca; spread Rabat, Tangier.

**IV. Basis anti-French resistance:**

- A. Incompatibility nationalist desire independence with French determination maintain perhaps expand control.
- B. Erupted Aug 1953 with deposition of popular pro-nationalist sultan.

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**C. French "reforms", opposed by ex-sultan  
approved by successor.**

1. Strip sultanate remaining power.
2. Extend French control.

**V. Prospects not good:**

- A. French lost contact friendly elements.  
Formerly pro-French Moroccans are now  
critical of French policy.**
- B. Positions hardened both sides. Mutual  
distrust. Nationalists sceptical any  
concessions by French.**
- C. Nationalists probably not settle short  
public promise independence with definite  
timetable and immediate steps autonomy.  
Change of sultans alone not enough.**
- D. French probably unable make real  
concessions: Prestige factors; strategic  
values, including source manpower.  
Strong opposition any concessions from  
small but influential local French  
community.**

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